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Abstract
Ambiguity refers to a decision situation under uncertainty when there is incomplete information
about the likelihood of events. Different formal models of this notion have been developed with
differing implications about the representation of ambiguity and ambiguity aversion.
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Most economic decisions are made under uncertainty. Decision makers are often aware of vari-
ables which will inﬂuence the outcomes of their actions, but which are beyond their control.
The quality of their decisions depends, however, on predicting these variables as correctly as
possible. Long-term investment decisions provide typical examples, since their success is also
determined by uncertain political, environmental and technological developments over the life-
time of the investment. In this chapter we review recent work on decision makers’ behaviour in
the face of such risks and the implications of these choices for economics and public policy.
Over the past ﬁfty years decision making under uncertainty was mostly viewed as choice over
a number of prospects each of which gives rise to speciﬁed outcomes with known probabilities.
Actions of decision makers were assumed to lead to well-deﬁned probability distributions over
outcomes. Hence, choices of actions could be identiﬁed with choices of probability distribu-
tions. The expected-utility paradigm (see Chapter 2) provides a strong foundation for ranking
probability distributions over outcomes while taking into account a decision-maker’s subjec-
tive risk preference. Describing uncertainty by probability distributions, expected utility theory
could also use the powerful methods of statistics. Indeed, many of the theoretical achievements
in economics over the past ﬁve decades were due to the successful application of the expected-
utility approach to economic problems in ﬁnance and information economics.
At the same time, criticism of the expected utility model has risen on two accounts. On the
one hand, following Allais (1953)’s seminal article, more and more experimental evidence was
accumulated contradicting the expected utility decision criterion, even in the case were subjects
had to choose among prospects with controlled probabilities (compare Chapter 3 and Chapter
4). On the other hand, in practice for many economic decisions the probabilities of the relevant
events are not obviously clear. This chapter deals with decision-making when some or all of the
relevant probabilities are unknown.
In practice nearly all economic decisions involve unknown probabilities. Indeed, situations
2where probabilities are known are relatively rare and conﬁned to the following cases:
1. Gambling: Gambling devices, such as dice, coin-tossing, roulette wheels, etc., are often
symmetric which means that probabilities can be calculated from relative frequencies with a
reasonable degree of accuracy
1.
2. Insurance: Insurance companies usually have access to actuarial tables which give them
fairly good estimates of the relevant probabilities
2.
3. Laboratory experiments: Researchers have artiﬁcially created choices with known probabil-
ities in laboratories.
Many current policy questions concern ambiguous risks. For instance, how to respond to threats
from terrorism and rogue states and the likely impact of new technologies. Many environmental
risks are ambiguous due to limited knowledgeoftherelevant scienceand because outcomes will
only be seen many decades from now. The effects of global warming and the environmental
impact of genetically modiﬁed crops are two examples. The hurricanes which hit Florida in
2004 and the Tsunami of 2004 can also be seen as ambiguous risks. Although these events
are outside human control, one can ask whether the economic system can or should share these
risks among individuals.
Even if probabilities of events are unknown, this observation does not preclude that individual
decision makers may hold beliefs about these events which can be represented by a subjective
probability distribution. In a path-breaking contribution to the theory of decision-making under
uncertainty, Savage (1954) showed that one can deduce a unique subjective probability distri-
bution over events with unknown probabilities from a decision maker’s choice behaviour if it
satisﬁes certain axioms. Moreover, this decision maker’s choices maximise an expected utility
functional of state-contingent outcomes, where the expectation is taken with respect to this sub-
jective probability distribution. Savage (1954)’s Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) theory offers
anattractivewaytocontinueworkingwiththeexpected-utilityapproacheveniftheprobabilities
1 The fact that most people prefer to bet on symmetric devices is itself evidence for ambiguity aversion.
2 However it should be noted that many insurance contracts contain an ‘act of God’ clause declaring
the contract void if an ambiguous event happens. This indicates some doubts about the accuracy
of the probability distributions gleaned from the actuarial data.
3of events are unknown. SEU can be seen as a decision model under uncertainty with unknown
probabilities of events where, nevertheless, agents whose behaviour satisﬁes the Savage axioms
can be modelled as expected-utility maximisers with a subjective probability distribution over
events. Using the SEU hypothesis in economics raises, however, some difﬁcult questions about
the consistency of subjective probability distributions across different agents. Moreover, the
behavioural assumptions necessary for a subjective probability distribution are not supported
by evidence as the following section will show.
Before proceeding, we shall deﬁne terms. The distinction of risk and uncertainty can be at-
tributed to Knight (1921). Thenotion of ambiguity, however, is probably due to Ellsberg (1961).
He associates it with the lack of information about relative likelihoods in situations which are
characterised neither by risk nor by complete uncertainty. In this chapter, uncertainty will be
used as a generic term to describe all states of information about probabilities. The term risk
will be used when the relevant probabilities are known. Ambiguity will refer to situations where
some or all of the relevant information about probabilities is missing. Choices are said to be
ambiguous if they are inﬂuenced by events whose probabilities are unknown or difﬁcult to de-
termine.
2 Experimental evidence
There is strong evidence which indicates that, in general, people do not have subjective proba-
bilities in situations involving uncertainty. The best-known examples are the experiments of the
Ellsberg Paradox
3.
Example 2.1 (Ellsberg (1961)) Ellsberg paradox I: three-colour-urn experiment
There is an urn which contains 90 balls. The urn contains 30 red balls (R), and the remainder
are known to be either black (B) or yellow (Y), but the number of balls which have each of
these two colours is unknown. One ball will be drawn at random.
Consider the following bets: (a) "Win 100 if a red ball is drawn", (b) "Win 100 if a black ball
3 NoticethattheseexperimentsprovideevidencenotjustagainstSEUbutagainstalltheorieswhichmodelbeliefs
as additive probabilities.
4is drawn", (c) "Win 100 if a red or yellow ball is drawn", (d) "Win 100 if a black or yellow ball
is drawn". This experiment may be summarised in the table below.
30 60
R B Y
Choice 1: "Choose either a 100 0 0
bet a or bet b". b 0 100 0
Choice 2: "Choose either c 100 0 100
bet c or bet d". d 0 100 100
Ellsberg (1961) offered several colleagues these choices. When faced with them most subjects
stated that they prefer a to b and d to c.
It is easy to check algebraically that there is no subjective probability, which is capable of
representing the stated choices as maximising the expected value of any utility function. In
order to see this, suppose to the contrary, that the decision-maker does indeed have a subjective
probability distribution. Then since (s)he prefers a to b (s)he must have a higher subjective
probability for a red ball being drawn than for a black ball. But the fact that (s)he prefers d to
c implies that (s)he has a higher subjective probability for a black ball being drawn than for a
red ball. These two deductions are contradictory.
It is easy to come up with hypotheses which might explain this behaviour. It seems that the
subjects are choosing gambles where the probabilities are "better known". Ellsberg (1961) (on
page 657) suggests the following interpretation:
"Responsesfrom confessed violatorsindicatethat the differenceis not tobe found in terms of thetwo factorscommonly
used to determine a choice situation, the relative desirability of the possible pay-offs and the relative likelihood of the
events affecting them, but in a third dimension of the problem of choice: the nature of one’s information concerning the
relative likelihood of events. What is at issue might be called the ambiguity of information, a quality depending on the
amount, type, reliability and "unanimity" of information, and giving rise to one’s degree of ’conﬁdence’ in an estimate
of relative likelihoods."
The Ellsberg experiments seem to suggest that subjects avoid the options with unknown prob-
abilities. Experimental studies conﬁrm a preference for betting on events with information
about probabilities. Camerer and Weber (1992) provide a comprehensive survey of the litera-
ture on experimental studies of decision-making under uncertainty with unknown probabilities
of events. Based on this literature, Camerer and Weber (1992) view ambiguity as "uncertainty
5about probability, created by missing information thatisrelevantand could beknown" (Camerer
and Weber (1992), page 330).
The concept of the weight of evidence, advanced by Keynes (1921) in order to distinguish the
probability of an event from the evidence supporting it, appears closely related to the notion of
ambiguity arising from known-to-be-missing information (Camerer (1995), p. 645). As Keynes
(1921)wrote: "Newevidencewill sometimes decreasetheprobability ofan argument, but itwill
always increase its weight." The greater the weight of evidence, the less ambiguity a decision
maker experiences.
If ambiguity arises from missing information or lack of evidence, then it appears natural to
assume that decision makers will dislike ambiguity. One may call such attitudes ambiguity-
averse. Indeed, as Camerer and Weber (1992) summarise their ﬁndings, "ambiguity aversion is
found consistently in variants of the Ellsberg problems..." (page 340).
There is a second experiment supporting the Ellsberg paradox which sheds additional light on
the sources of ambiguity.
Example 2.2 (Ellsberg (1961)) Ellsberg paradox II: two-urn experiment
There are two urns which contain 100 black (B) or red (R) balls. Urn 1 contains 50 black balls
and 50 red balls. For Urn 2 no information is available. From both urns one ball will be drawn
at random.
Consider the following bets: (a) "Win 100 if a black ball is drawn from Urn 1", (b) "Win 100
if a red ball is drawn from Urn 1", (c) "Win 100 if a black ball is drawn from Urn 2", (d) "Win
100 if a red ball is drawn from Urn 2". This experiment may be summarised in the table below.
Urn 1 Urn 2
50 50
B R
a 100 0
b 0 100
100
B R
c 100 0
d 0 100
Faced with the choices "Choose either bet a or bet c" (Choice 1) and "Choose either bet b
or bet d" ( Choice 2) most subjects stated that they prefer a to c and b to d.
6As in Example 2.1, it is easy to check that there is no subjective probability which is capable of
representing the stated choices as maximising expected utility.
Example 2.2 also conﬁrms the preference of decision makers for known probabilities. The
psychological literature (Tversky and Fox (1995)) tends to interpret the observed behaviour in
the Ellsberg two-urn experiment as evidence "that people’s preference depend not only on their
degree of uncertainty but also on the source of uncertainty" (Tversky and Wakker (1995), p.
1270). In the Ellsberg two-urn experiment subjects preferred any bet on the urn with known
proportions of black and red balls, the ﬁrst source of uncertainty, to the equivalent bet on the
urn where this information is not available, the second source of uncertainty. More generally
people prefer to bet on a better known source.
Sources of uncertainty are sets of events which belong to the same context. Tversky and Fox
(1995), e.g., comparebetsonarandomdevicewithbetsontheDow-Jonesindex, onfootballand
basketball results, or temperatures in different cities. In contrast to the Ellsberg observations in
Example 2.2, Heath and Tversky (1991) report a preference for betting on events with unknown
probabilities compared to betting on the random devices for which the probabilities of events
were known. Heath and Tversky (1991) and Tversky and Fox (1995) attribute this ambiguity
preference to the competence which the subjects felt towards the source of the ambiguity. In the
study by Tversky and Fox (1995) basketball fans were signiﬁcantly more often willing to bet
on basketball outcomes than on chance devices and San Francisco residents preferred to bet on
San Francisco temperature rather than on a random device with known probabilities.
Whether subjects felt a preference for or an aversion against betting on the events with un-
known probabilities, the experimental results indicate a systematic difference between the de-
cision weights revealed in choice behaviour and the assessed probabilities of events. There is
a substantial body of experimental evidence that deviations are of the form illustrated in Fig-
ure 1. If the decision weights of an event would coincide with the assessed probability of
this event as SEU suggests, then the function w(p) depicted in Figure 1 should equal the iden-
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Figure 1. Probability weighting function
tity. Tversky and Fox (1995) and others
4 observe consistently that decision weights exceed the
probabilities of unlikely events and fall short of the probabilities near certainty. This S-shaped
weighting function reﬂects the distinction between certainty and possibility which was noted by
Kahneman and Tversky (1979). While the decision weights are almost linear for events which
are possible but neither certain nor impossible, they deviate substantially for small-probability
events.
Decision weights can be observed in experiments. They reﬂect a decision maker’s ranking of
events in terms of the willingness to bet on the event. In general, they do not coincide, however,
with the decision maker’s assessment of the probability of the event. Decision weights capture
both a decision maker’s perceived ambiguity and the attitude towards it. Wakker (2001) inter-
prets the fact that small probabilities are over-weighted with optimism and the underweighting
of almost certain probabilities as pessimism. The extent of these deviations reﬂects the degree
of ambiguity held with respect to a subjectively assessed probability.
The experimental evidence collected on decision-making under ambiguity documents consis-
tent differences between betting behaviour and reported or elicited probabilities of events.
While people seem to prefer risk over ambiguity if they feel unfamiliar with a source, this
preference can be reversed if they feel competent about the source. Hence, we may expect
to see more optimistic behaviour in situations of ambiguity, where the source is familiar and
4 Gonzalez and Wu (1999) provide a survey of this psychological literature.
8pessimistic otherwise.
Actual economic behaviour shows a similar pattern. Faced with Ellsberg-type decision prob-
lems, where an obvious lack of information cannot be overcome by personal conﬁdence, most
people seem to exhibit ambiguity aversion and choose among bets in a pessimistic way. In other
situations, where the rewards are very uncertain, such as entering a career or setting up a small
business, people may feel competent enough to make choices with an optimistic attitude. De-
pending on the source of ambiguity, the same person may be ambiguity-averse in one context
and ambiguity-loving in an another.
3 Models of ambiguity
The leading model of choice under uncertainty, subjective expected utility theory (SEU), is due
to Savage (1954). In this theory, decision makers know that the outcomes of their actions will
depend on circumstances beyond their control, which are represented by a set of states of nature
S. The states are mutually exclusive and provide complete descriptions of the circumstances
determining the outcomes of the actions. Once a state becomes known, all uncertainty will be
resolved andtheoutcomeofthe action chosen will be realised. Ex anteitis not known, however,
which will be the true state. Ex post precisely one state will be revealed to be true. An act a
assigns an outcome a(s) ∈ X to each state of nature s ∈ S. It assumed that the decision-maker
has preferences ￿ over all possible acts. This provides a way of describing uncertainty without
specifying probabilities.
If preferences over acts satisfy some axioms, which attempt to capture reasonable behaviour
under uncertainty, then, as Savage (1954) shows, the decision-maker will have a utility function
over outcomes and a subjective probability distribution over the states of nature. Moreover (s)he
will choose so as to maximise the expected value of his/her utility with respect to his/her sub-
jective probability. SEU implies that individuals have beliefs about the likelihood of states that
can be represented by subjective probabilities. Savage (1954) can be, and has been, misunder-
stood as transforming decision making under ambiguity into decision under risk. Note however
9that beliefs, though represented by a probability distribution, are purely subjective. Formally,
people whose preference order ￿ satisﬁes the axioms of SEU can be described by a probability
distribution p over states in S and a utility function u over outcomes such that
a ￿ b ⇔
 
u(a(s)) dp(s) ￿
 
u(b(s)) dp(s).
SEU describes a decision maker who behaves like an expected-utility maximiser whose uncer-
tainty can be condensed into a subjective probability distribution, even if there is no known
probability distribution over states. Taking up an example by Savage (1954), an individual sat-
isfying the SEU axioms would be able to assign an exact number, such as 0.42 to the event
described by the proposition "The next president of the United States will be a Democrat".
There are good reasons, however, for believing that SEU does not provide an adequate model of
decision-makingunderambiguity. It seems unreasonableto assumethatthepresenceorabsence
of probability information will not affect behaviour. In unfamiliar circumstances, when there is
little evidence concerning the relevant variables, subjective certainty about the probabilities of
states appears a questionable assumption. Moreover, as the Ellsberg paradox and the literature
in Section 2 make abundantly clear, SEU is not supported by the experimental evidence
5.
This section surveys some of the leading theories of ambiguity and discusses the relations be-
tween them. The two most prominent approaches are Choquet expected utility (CEU) and the
multiple prior model (MP). CEU has the advantage of having a rigorous axiomatic foundation.
MP does not have an overall axiomatic foundation although some special cases of it have been
axiomatised.
3.1 Multiple Priors
If decision makers do not know the true probabilities of events is seems plausible to assume
that they might consider several probability distributions. The multiple prior approach suggests
a model of ambiguity based on this intuition. Suppose an individual considers a set P of prob-
ability distributions as possible. If there is no information at all, the set P may comprise all
probability distributions. More generally, the set P may reﬂect partial information. For exam-
5 This does not preclude that SEU provides a good normative theory, as many researchers believe.
10ple, in the Ellsberg three-urn example P may be the set of all probability distributions where
the probability of a red ball being drawn equals 1
3. For technical reasons P is assumed to be
closed and convex.
An ambiguity-averse decision maker may be modelled by preferences which evaluate an am-
biguous act by the worst expected utility possible given the set of probability distributions P.
i.e.,
a ￿ b ⇔ min
p∈P
 
u(a(s)) dp(s) ￿ min
p∈P
 
u(b(s)) dp(s).
These preferences provide an intuitive way to model a decision maker with a pessimistic at-
titude towards ambiguity. They are axiomatised in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and often
referred to as minimum expected utility (MEU). Similarly, one can model an ambiguity-loving
decision maker by a preference order, which evaluates acts by the most optimistic expected
utility possible with the given set of probability distributions P,
a ￿ b ⇔ max
p∈P
 
u(a(s)) dp(s) ￿ max
p∈P
 
u(b(s)) dp(s).
Preferences represented in this way are only capable of representing optimistic or pessimistic
attitudes towards ambiguity (ambiguity aversion or ambiguity preference). Attitudes towards
ambiguity which are optimistic for low-probability events and at the same time pessimistic for
high-probability events are precluded in these cases. The following modiﬁed version, however,
is capable of modelling ambiguity preference as well as ambiguity aversion.
A preference relation ￿ on the set of acts is said to model multiple priors (α-MP) if there exists
a closed and convex set of probability distributions P on S such that:
a ￿ b ⇔
αmin
p∈P
 
u(a(s)) dp(s) + (1 − α)max
p∈P
 
u(a(s)) dp(s)
￿ αmin
p∈P
 
u(b(s)) dp(s) + (1 − α)max
p∈P
 
u(b(s)) dp(s).
These preferences provide an intuitive way to model a decision maker whose reaction to ambi-
guity displays a mixture of optimism and pessimism. It is natural to associate the set of prob-
ability distributions P with the decision maker’s information about the probabilities of events
11and the parameter α with the attitude towards ambiguity. For α = 1, respectively α = 0, the
reaction is pessimistic (respectively optimistic), since the decision maker evaluates any given
act by the least (respectively, most) favourable probability distribution. Notice that the purely
pessimistic case (α = 1) coincides with MEU.
3.2 Choquet integral and capacities
A second related way of modelling ambiguity is to assume that individuals do have subjec-
tive beliefs, but that these beliefs, however, do not satisfy all the mathematical properties of a
probability distribution. In this case, decision weights may be deﬁned by a capacity, a kind of
non-additive subjective probability distribution. Choquet (1953) has proposed a deﬁnition of
an expected value with respect to a capacity, which coincides with the usual deﬁnition of an
expected value when the capacity is additive
6.
For simplicity, assume that the set of states S is ﬁnite. A capacity on S is a real-valued function
ν on the subsets of S such that A ⊆ B implies ν (A) ￿ ν (B). Moreover, one normalises
ν (∅) = 0 and ν (S) = 1. If, in addition, ν(A ∪ B) = ν(A) + ν(B) for disjoint events A,B
holds, then the capacity is a probability distribution. Probability distributions are, therefore,
specialcasesofcapacities. Anotherimportant exampleof acapacityis thecomplete-uncertainty
capacity deﬁned by ν (A) = 0 for all A   S.
If S is ﬁnite, then one can order the outcomes of any act a from lowest to highest, a1 < a2 <
... < am−1 < am.TheChoquet expected utility(CEU)ofan action awith respect tothecapacity
ν is given by the following formula,
 
u(a)dν =
m  
r=1
u(ar)[ν ({s|a(s) ≥ ar}) − ν ({s|a(s) ≥ ar+1})],
where we put {s|a(s) ≥ am+1} = ∅ for notational convenience.
Itiseasytocheckthatforanadditivecapacity, i.e., aprobabilitydistribution, onehasν ({s|a(s) ≥ ar}) =
ν ({s|a(s) = ar})+ν ({s|a(s) ≥ ar+1}) for all r. Hence, CEU coincides with the expected util-
ity of the act. For the complete-uncertainty capacity, the Choquet expected utility equals the
6 The theory and properties of capacities and theChoquet integral have been extensively studied. We will present
here only a simple version of the general theory, suitable for our discussion of ambiguity and ambiguity attitude.
For excellent surveys of the more formal theory, see Chateauneuf and Cohen (2000) and Denneberg (2000).
12utility of the worst outcome of this act,
 
u(a)dν = min
s∈S
u(a(s)).
Preferences over acts for which there is a unique capacity ν and a utility function u such that
a ￿ b ⇔
 
u(a)dν ≥
 
u(b)dν
will be referred to as Choquet expected utility (CEU) preferences. This representation has been
derived axiomatically by Schmeidler (1989), Gilboa (1987) and Sarin and Wakker (1992). It is
easy to see that the Ellsberg paradox can be explained by the CEU hypothesis.
3.3 Choquet expected utility (CEU) and multiple priors (MP)
CEU preferences do not coincide with α-MP preferences. These preference systems have,
however, animportantintersectioncharacterisedbyconvexcapacitiesandthecoreofacapacity.
A capacity is said to be convex if ν (A ∪ B) ￿ ν (A) +ν (B)−ν (A ∩ B) holds for any events
A,B in S. In particular, if two events are mutually exclusive, i.e., A ∩ B = ∅, then the sum
of the decision weights attached to the events A and B does not exceed the decision weight
associated with their union A ∪ B.
For any capacity ν on S, one can deﬁne a set of probability distributions called the core of the
capacity ν, core(ν). The core of a capacity ν is the set of probability distributions which yield
a higher probability for each event than the capacity ν,
core(ν) = {p ∈ ∆(S)| p(A) ￿ ν (A) for all A ⊆ S},
where we write ∆(S) for the set of all probability distributions on S and p(A) for
 
s∈Ap(s).
If the capacity satisﬁes ν (A ∪ B) = ν (A) + ν (B) − ν (A ∩ B) for all events A and B, then it
is a probability distribution and the core consists of only this probability distribution.
If the core of a capacity is non-empty, then it deﬁnes a set of probability distributions associated
with the capacity. The capacity may be viewed as a set of constraints on the set of probability
distributions which a decision maker considers possible. These constraints may arise from the
decision maker’s information about the probability of events. If a decision maker faces no
ambiguity, the capacity will be additive, i.e., a probability distribution, and the core will consist
of this single probability distribution.
13Example 3.1 In Example 2.1, e.g., one could consider the state space S = {R,B,Y } and the
capacity ν deﬁned by
ν(E) =

 
 
1
3 if {R} ⊆ E
2
3 if {B,Y } ⊆ E
0 otherwise
for any event E  = S. This capacity ν is convex and its core is the set of probability distributions
p with p(R) = 1
3, core(ν) = {p ∈ ∆(S)| p(R) = 1
3}.
It is natural to ask when a capacity will deﬁne a set of priors such that the representations of
CEU and α-MP coincide. Schmeidler (1989) proved that for a convex capacity, the Choquet
integral for any act a is equal to the minimum of the expected utility of a, where the minimum
is taken over the probabilities in the core. If ν is an convex capacity on S, then
 
u(a)dν = min
p∈core(ν)
 
u(a(s))dp(s).
Since the core of a convex capacity is never empty, this result provides a partial answer to
our question. It shows that the α-MP-preference representation equals the CEU-preference
representation if α = 1 holds and if the capacity ν is convex.
Jaffray and Philippe (1997) show a more general relationship between α-MP-preferences and
CEU-preferences
7. Let   be a convex capacity on S and for any α ∈ [0,1] deﬁne the capacity
ν(A) := α (A) + (1 − α)[1 −  (S\A)],
which we will call JP-capacity. JP-capacities allow preferences to be represented in both the α-
MP and CEU forms. For α ∈ [0,1] and a convex capacity  , let ν be the associated JP-capacity,
then one obtains
 
u(a)dν = α min
p∈core( )
 
u(a(s))dp(s) + (1 − α) max
p∈core( )
 
u(a(s))dp(s).
The CEU-preferences with respect to the JP-capacity, ν, coincide with the α-MP-preferences,
where the set of priors is the core of the convex capacity   on which the JP-capacity depends,
7 Recently, Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2004) have axiomatised a representation
V (f) = α(f)min
p∈P
 
u(f(s))dp(s) + (1 − α(f))max
p∈P
 
u(f(s))dp(s),
where the set of probability distributions P is determined endogenously and where the weights α(f)
depend on the act f.
Nehring (2007) axiomatises a representation where the set of priors can be determined partially
exogenously and partially endogenously.
14P = core( ). As in the case of α-MP-preferences, it is natural to interpret α as a parameter
related to the ambiguity attitude and the core of  , the set of priors, as describing the ambiguity
of the decision maker.
A special case of a JP-capacity, which illustrates how a capacity constrains the set of probability
distributions in the core is the neo-additive capacity
8. A neo-additive capacity is a JP-capacity
with a convex capacity   deﬁned by  (E) = (1 − δ)π(E) for all events E  = S, where π is a
probability distribution on S. In this case,
P = core( ) = {p ∈ ∆(S)| p(E) ≥ (1 − δ)π(E)}
is the set of priors. A decision maker with beliefs represented by a neo-additive capacity may be
viewed asholding ambiguous beliefsaboutan additiveprobability distributionπ.Theparameter
δ determines the size of the set of probabilities around π which the decision maker considers
possible. It can be interpreted as a measure of the decision maker’s ambiguity.
π1
.......................................... .........................................
.....................................
￿
π2 π3
p1 = (1 − δ)π1
p2 = (1 − δ)π2
p3 = (1 − δ)π3
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
P
p2 = 1 p3 = 1
p1 = 1
Figure 2. Core of a neo-additive capacity
Figure 2 illustrates the core of a neo-additive capacity for the case of three states. The outer
triangle represents the set of all probability distributions
9 over the three states S = {s1,s2,s3}.
8 Neo-additive capacities are axiomatised and carefully discussed in Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2007).
9 Figure 2 is the projection of the three-dimensional simplex onto the plane. Corner points correspond to the
degenerate probability distributions assigning probability pi = 1 to state si and pj = 0 to all other states. Points on
the edge of the triangle opposite the corner pi = 1 assign probability of zero to the state si. Points on a line parallel
to an edge of the triangle, e.g., the ones marked pi = (1 − δ)πi, are probability distributions for which pi = (1 −
δ)πi holds. Moreover, if onedraws alinefromacornerpoint, sayp1 = 1, through thepointπ = (π1,π2,π3)in the
triangle to theopposing edge, then thedistance fromtheopposing edge to thepoint π represents theprobability π1.
15Each point in this triangle represents a probability distribution p = (p1,p2,p3). The set P of
probability distributions in the core of the neo-additive capacity   is represented by the inner
triangle with the probability distribution π = (π1,π2,π3) as its centre.
4 Ambiguity and ambiguity attitude
A central, yet so far still not completely resolved problem in modelling ambiguity concerns the
separation of ambiguity and ambiguity attitude. As discussed in Section 2, early experiments,
e.g., Ellsberg (1961), suggested an aversion of decision makers against ambiguity arising from
the lack of information about the probability of events. The negative attitude towards ambiguity
seems not to hold in to situations where the decision maker has no information about the prob-
abilities of events, but feels competent about the situation. Experimental evidence suggests that
a decision maker who feels as expert in an ambiguous situation is likely to prefer an ambiguous
act to an unambiguous one, e.g., Tversky and Fox (1995).
Separating ambiguity and ambiguity attitude is important for economic models because atti-
tudes towards ambiguity of a decision maker may be seen as stable personal characteristics,
whereas the experienced ambiguity varies with the information about the environment. Here,
information should not be understood in the Bayesian sense of evidence which allows one to
condition a given probability distribution. Information refers to evidence which in the deci-
sion maker’s opinion may have some impact on the likelihood of decision-relevant events. For
example, one may reasonably assume that an entrepreneur who undertakes a new investment
project feels ambiguity about the chances of success. Observing success and failure of other
entrepreneurs with similar, but different projects is likely to affect ambiguity. Information about
the success of a competitor’s investment may reduce ambiguity, while failure of it may have the
opposite effect. Hence, the entrepreneur’s degree of ambiguity may change with such informa-
tion. In contrast, it seems reasonable to assume that optimism or pessimism, understood as the
underlying propensity to take on uncertain risks, are a more permanent feature of the decision
maker’s personality.
16Achieving such a separation is complicated by two additional desiderata.
(i) In the spirit of Savage (1954), one would like to derive all decision-relevant concepts purely
from assumptions about the preferences over acts.
(ii) The distinction of ambiguity and ambiguity attitude should be compatible with the notion
of risk attitudes in cases of decision making under risk.
The second desideratum is further complicated since there are differing notions of risk attitudes
in SEU and rank-dependent expected utility (RDEU)
10, as introduced by Quiggin (1982).
The three approaches outlined here differ in these respects. Ultimately, the answer to the ques-
tion how to separate ambiguity from ambiguity attitude may determine the choice among the
different models of decision making under ambiguity discussed in Section 3.
4.1 Ambiguity aversion and convexity
The Ellsberg paradox suggests that people dislike the ambiguity of not knowing the probability
distribution over states, e.g., the proportions of balls in the urn. In an effort to ﬁnd preference
representations which are compatible with the behaviour observed in this paradox, most of
the early research assumed ambiguity aversion and attributed all deviations between decision
weights and probabilities to the ambiguity experienced by the decision maker.
Denote by A the set of acts. Schmeidler (1989) and Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) assume
that acts yield lotteries as outcomes
11. Hence, for constant acts, decision makers choose among
lotteries. In this framework, one can deﬁne (pointwise) convex combinations of acts. An act
with such a convex combination of lotteries as outcomes can be interpreted as a reduction in
ambiguity, because there is a state-wise diversiﬁcation of lottery risks. A decision maker is
called ambiguity averse if any 1
2-convex combination of two indifferent acts is considered at
least as good as these acts, formally,
for all acts a,b ∈ A with a ∼ b holds
 
1
2
 
a +
 
1
2
 
b ￿ b. (Ambiguity aversion)
For preferences satisfying ambiguity aversion, Schmeidler (1989) shows that the capacity of the
10 Chapters 3 and 4 of this Handbook deal with rank-dependent expected utility and other non-expected
utility theories.
11 Anscombe and Aumann (1963) introduced this notion of an act in order to simplify the derivation of SEU.
17CEU representation must be convex. Moreover, for the derivation of the MEU representation,
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) include ambiguity aversion as an axiom.
In a recent article, Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2004) provide a useful exposition of
the axiomatic relationship among representations. For a given utility function u over lotteries,
one can treat the act a as a parameter and denote by ua : S → R the function ua(s) := u(a(s))
which associates with each state s the utility of the lottery assigned to this state by the act a ∈
A. Five standard assumptions
12 on the preference order ￿ on A characterise a representation
by a positively homogeneous and constant-additive
13 functional I(f) on the set of real-valued
functions f and a non-constant afﬁne function u : X → R such that, for any acts a,b ∈ A,
a ￿ b ⇐⇒ I(ua) ≥ I(ub).
Ifthepreferenceordersatisﬁesinadditionambiguityaversion, thenthereisauniquenon-empty,
compact, convex set of probabilities P such that
I(ua) = min
p∈P
 
u(a(s)) dp(s). (MEU)
The CEU and SEU representations can now be obtained by extending the independence axiom
to larger classes of acts.
(i) CEU: If the preference order satisﬁes in addition comonotonic independence, i.e.,
for all comonotonic
14acts a,b ∈ A with a ∼ b holds
 
1
2
 
a +
 
1
2
 
b ∼ b,
(Comonotonic Independence)
then there is a convex capacity ν on S such that
I(ua)) =
 
u(a) dν. (CEU)
(ii) SEU: If the preference order satisﬁes independence, i.e.,
for all acts a,b ∈ A with a ∼ b holds
 
1
2
 
a +
 
1
2
 
b ∼ b, (Independence)
12 The ﬁve axioms are weak order, certainty independence, Archimedian axiom, monotonicity, and
nondegeneracy. For more details, compare Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2004), p.141.
13 The functional I is constant-additive if I(f +c) = I(f)+c holds for any function f : S → R and any constant
c ∈ R. The functional I is positively homogeneous if I(λf) = λI(f) for any function f : S → R and all λ ≥ 0.
14 Two acts a,b ∈ F are comonotonic, if there exists no s,s′ ∈ S such that a(s) ≻ a(s′) and
b(s′) ≻ b(s). This implies that comonotonic acts rank the states in the same way.
18then there is a probability distribution π on S such that
I(ua) =
 
u(a(s)) dπ(s). (SEU)
Given ambiguity aversion, the CEU model is more restrictive than the MEU model, since it
requiresalso comonotonicindependence. As explainedin Subsection 3.3, for convexcapacities,
the core is non-empty and represents the set of priors. Imposing independence for all acts makes
SEU the most restrictive model. In this case, strict ambiguity aversion is ruled out. Only the
limiting case of a unique additive probability distribution π remains, which coincides with the
capacity in CEU and forms the trivial set of priors P = {π} for MEU.
A priori, this approach allows only for a negative attitude towards ambiguity. Any deviation
from expected utility can, therefore, be interpreted as ambiguity. Hence, absence of ambiguity
coincides with SEU preferences.
4.2 Comparative ambiguity aversion
In the context of decision making under risk, Yaari (1969) deﬁnes a decision maker A as more
risk averse than decision maker B, if A ranks a certain outcome higher than a lottery whenever
B prefers the certain outcome over this lottery. If one deﬁnes a decision maker as risk-neutral
who rank lotteries according to their expected value, then one can classify decision makers as
risk-averse and risk-loving according to whether they are more, respectively less, risk-averse
than a risk-neutral decision maker. Note that the reference case of risk-neutrality is arbitrarily
chosen.
In the spirit of Yaari (1969), a group of articles
15 propose comparative notions of "more ambigu-
ity averse". Epstein (1999) deﬁnes a decision maker A as more ambiguity averse
16 than decision
maker B, if A prefers an unambiguous act over another arbitrary act whenever B ranks these
acts in this way. For this deﬁnition the notion of an "unambiguous act" has to be introduced.
Epstein (1999) assumes that there is a set of unambiguous events for which decision makers can
15 Kelsey and Nandeibam (1996), Epstein (1999), Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002), and Grant and
Quiggin (2005) use the comparative approach for separating ambiguity and ambiguity attitude.
16 Epstein (1999) calls such a relation "more uncertainty averse". Since we use uncertainty as a
generic term, which covers also the case where a decision maker is probabilistically sophisticated,
we prefer the dubbing of Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002).
19assign probabilities. Acts which are measurable with regard to these unambiguous events are
called unambiguous acts.
Epstein uses probabilistically sophisticated preferences as the benchmark to deﬁne ambiguity
neutrality. Probabilistically sophisticated decision makers assign a unique probability distribu-
tion to all events such that they can rank all acts by ranking the induced lotteries over outcomes,
see Machina and Schmeidler (1992). SEU decision makers are probabilistically sophisticated,
but there are other non-SEU preferences which are also probabilistically sophisticated
17.
Decision makers are ambiguity averse, respectively ambiguity loving, if they are more, respec-
tively less, ambiguity averse than a probabilistically sophisticated decision maker. Hence, am-
biguity neutral decision makers are probabilistically sophisticated. Ambiguity neutral decision
makers do not experience ambiguity. Though they may not know the probability of events, their
beliefs can be represented by a subjective probability distribution.
If a decision maker has pessimistic MEU preferences and if all prior probability distributions
coincide on the unambiguous events, then the decision maker is ambiguity averse in the sense
of Epstein (1999). A CEU preference order is ambiguity averse if there is an additive proba-
bility distribution in the core of the capacity with respect to which the decision maker is prob-
abilistically sophisticated for unambiguous acts. Hence, convexity of the capacity is neither a
necessary nor a sufﬁcient condition for ambiguity aversion in the sense of Epstein (1999). Am-
biguity neutrality coincides with the absence of perceived ambiguity since an ambiguity neutral
decision maker has a subjective probability distribution over all events. Hence, risk preferences
reﬂected by the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility in the case of SEU are independent of the
ambiguity attitude. A disadvantage of Epstein (1999)’s approach is, however, the assumption
that there is an exogenously given set of unambiguous events
18.
GhirardatoandMarinacci(2002)alsosuggestacomparativenotionofambiguityaversion. They
17 Probabilistical sophistication is a concept introduced by Machina and Schmeidler (1992) in order to
accommodate experimentally observed deviations from expected utility in the context of choice over
lotteries. A typical case of probabilistically sophisticated preferences are rank-dependent expected
utility (RDEU) proposed by Quiggin (1982) for choice when the probabilities are known.
18 In Epstein and Zhang (2001), unambiguous events are deﬁned based purely on behavioural assumptions.
See, however, Nehring (2006b) who raises some questions about the purely behavioural approach.
20call a decision maker A more ambiguity averse than decision maker B if A prefers a constant
act over another act whenever B ranks these acts in this way. In contrast to Epstein (1999),
Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) use constant acts, rather than unambiguous acts, in order to
deﬁne the relation "more ambiguity averse". The obvious advantage is that they do not need to
assumetheexistenceofunambiguousacts. Thedisadvantageliesinthefactthatthiscomparison
does not distinguish between attitudes towards risk and attitudes towards ambiguity. Hence, for
two decision makers with SEU preferences holding the same beliefs, i.e., the Yaari case, A
will be considered more ambiguity averse than B simply because A has a more concave von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function than B. A disadvantage of this theory is that it implies
that the usual preferences in the Allais paradox exhibit ambiguity-aversion. However most
researchers do not consider ambiguity to be a signiﬁcant factor in the Allias Paradox.
Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002), therefore, restrict attention to preference orders which allow
for a CEU representation over binary acts. They dub such preferences "biseparable". The class
of biseparable preferences comprises SEU, CEU, and MEU and is characterised by a well-
deﬁned von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. In this context it is possible to control for
risk preferences as reﬂected in the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. Biseparable
preferences which have the (up to an afﬁne transformation) same von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function are called cardinally symmetric.
As the reference case of ambiguity neutrality, Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) take cardinally
symmetric SEU decision makers. Hence, decision makers are ambiguity averse (respectively,
ambiguity loving) if they have cardinally symmetric biseparable preferences and if they are
more (respectively, less) ambiguity averse than a SEU decision maker.
Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) show that CEU decision makers are ambiguity averse if and
only if the core of the capacity characterizing them is non-empty. In contrast to Epstein (1999),
convexity of the preference order is sufﬁcient for ambiguity aversion but not necessary. MEU
individuals are ambiguity averse in the sense of Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002).
Characterising ambiguity attitude by a comparative notion as in Epstein (1999) and Ghirardato
21and Marinacci (2002) it is necessary to identify (i) acts as more or less ambiguous and (ii) a
preference order as ambiguity neutral. In the case of Epstein (1999), unambiguous acts, i.e.,
acts measurable with respect to unambiguous events, are considered less ambiguous than other
acts and probabilistically sophisticated preferences were suggested as ambiguity neutral. For
Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) constant acts are less ambiguous than other acts and SEU
preferences are ambiguity neutral.
It is possible to provide other comparative notions of ambiguity by either varying the notion of
the less ambiguous acts or the type of reference preferences which are considered ambiguity
neutral. Grant and Quiggin (2005) suggest a concept of "more uncertain" acts. For ease of
exposition, assume that acts map states into utilities. Comparing two acts a and b, consider a
partition of the state space in two events, Ba and Wa such that a(s) ￿ a(t) for all s ∈ Ba and
all t ∈ Wa. Then Grant and Quiggin (2005) call act b an elementary increase in uncertainty
of act a if there are positive numbers α and β such that b(s) = a(s) + α for all s ∈ Ba and
b(s) = a(s)−β for all s ∈ Wa. Act b has outcomes which are higher by a constant α than those
of act a for states yielding high outcomes and outcomes which are lower by β than those of act
a for states with low outcomes. In this sense, exposure to ambiguity is higher for act b than for
act a. A decision maker A is at least as uncertainty averse as decision maker B if A prefers an
act a over act b whenever b is an elementary increase in uncertainty of a and B prefers a over b.
For the reference case of uncertainty neutrality they use SEU preferences.
IncontrasttoGhirardato andMarinacci (2002), Grant andQuiggin(2005)do notcontrol forrisk
preferences reﬂected by the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. Hence, a SEU decision
maker A is more uncertainty averse than another SEU decision maker B if both have the same
beliefs, represented by an additive probability distribution over states and if A’s von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function is a concave transformation of B’s von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function. Using concepts introduced by Chateauneuf, Cohen, and Meilijson (2005),
Grant and Quiggin (2005) characterise more uncertainty averse CEU decision makers by a
pessimism index exceeding an index of relative concavity of the von Neumann-Morgenstern
22utility functions.
4.3 Optimism and pessimism
Inspired by the Allais paradox, Wakker (2001) suggests a notion of optimism and pessimism
based on choice behaviour over acts. These notions do not depend on a speciﬁc form of rep-
resentation. The appeal of this approach lies in its immediate testability in experiments and
its link to properties of capacities in the CEU model. For the CEU representation, Wakker
(2001) shows that optimism corresponds to concavity and pessimism to convexity of a capac-
ity. Moreover, Wakker (2001) provides a method to behaviourally characterise decision makers
who overweight events with extreme outcomes, a fact which is often observed in experiments
19.
For ease of exposition, assume again that acts associate real numbers with states. Table 1
shows fouractsa1,a2,a3,a4 deﬁnedonapartitionofthestatespace{H,A,I,L} withoutcomes
M > m > 0.
H A I L
a1 m m 0 0
a2 M 0 0 0
a3 m m m 0
a4 M 0 m 0
Table 1
For given M, assume that m is chosen such that the decision maker is indifferent between acts
a1 and a2, i.e., a1 ∼ a2. Wakker (2001) calls a decision maker pessimistic if a3 is preferred to
a4, i.e., a3 ￿ a4, and optimistic if the opposite preference is revealed, i.e., a3 ￿ a4.
The intuition is as follows. Conditional on the events H or A occurring, m is the certainty
equivalent to the partial act yielding M on H and 0 on A. In acts a3 and a4 the outcome on the
"irrelevant" event I has been increased from 0 to m. Of course, a SEU decision maker will be
indifferent also between acts a3 and a4. For a pessimistic decision maker, the increase in the
outcome on the event I makes the partial certainty equivalent more attractive. In contrast, an
optimistic decision maker will now prefer the act a4, because the increase in the outcome on the
19 Compare Figure 1 in Section 2.
23event I makes the partial act M on H and 0 on A more attractive.
A key result of Wakker (2001) shows that for CEU preferences, pessimism implies a convex
capacity and optimism a concave capacity. Moreover, for CEU preferences, one can deﬁne a
weak order on events, which orders any two events as one being revealed more likely than the
other. This order allows one to deﬁne intervals of events. It is possible to restrict optimism or
pessimism to non-degenerate intervals of events. Hence, if there is an event E such that the
decision maker is optimistic for all events, which are revealed less likely than E and pessimistic
for all events, which are revealed more likely than E, then this decision maker will overweight
events with extreme outcomes. For a CEU decision maker, in this case, the capacity will be
partially concave and partially convex.
One may be inclined to think that a decision maker who is both pessimistic and optimistic,
i.e., with a3 ∼ a4, will have SEU preferences. This is, however, not true. For example, a
CEU decision maker with preferences represented by the capacity ν(E) = (1 − δ)π(E) for
all E  = S, where π is an additive probability distribution on S and δ ∈ (0,1), will rank acts
according to
 
u(a)dν = δ min
s∈S
u(a(s))+(1−δ) 
 
u(a)dπ.Straightforward computations show
that
 
u(a1)dν =
 
u(a2)dν holds if and only if π(H∪A) u(m) = π(H) u(M)+π(A) u(0).
Hence,
 
u(a3)dν −
 
u(a4)dν
= (1 − δ)[π(H ∪ A)   u(m) − π(H)   u(M) − π(A)   u(0)] = 0.
This CEU decision maker behaves like a SEU decision maker as long as the minimum of acts
remains unchanged. For acts with varying worst outcome, however, the behaviour would be
quite distinct. It is easy to check that the capacity ν is convex
20. Hence, a decision maker who
evaluates acts a3 and a4 as indifferent, need not have SEU preferences.
5 Economic applications
Important economic insights depend on the way in which decision making under uncertainty
20 Note, however, that the capacity does not satisfy the solvability condition imposed by Wakker
(2001) (assumption 5.1, p. 1047) which is required for the full characterisations in Theorems 5.2 and 5.4.
24is modelled. Despite the obvious discrepancies between choice behaviour predicted based on
SEU preferences and actual behaviour in controlled laboratory experiments, SEU has become
the most commonly applied model in economics. SEU decision makers behave like Bayesian
statisticians. TheyupdatebeliefsaccordingtoBayes’ruleandbehaveconsistentlywithunderly-
ing probability distributions. In particular, in ﬁnancial economics where investors are modelled
who choose portfolios and in contract theory where agents design contracts suitable to share
risks and to deal with information problems important results depend on this assumption.
Nevertheless, in both ﬁnancial economics and contract theory, there are phenomena which are
hard or impossible to reconcile with SEU preferences. Therefore, there is a growing research in
the implications of alternative models of decision making under uncertainty. Applications range
from auctions, bargaining, and contract theory to liability rules. There are several surveys of
economic applications, e.g., Chateauneuf and Cohen (2000), Mukerji (2000), and Mukerji and
Tallon (2004). We will describe here only two results of general economic importance relating
to ﬁnancial economics and risk sharing.
(i) Financial Economics
If ambiguity aversion is assumed then CEU and α-MP preferences have a kink at points of cer-
tain consumption. Thus they are not even locally risk neutral. The model of ﬁnancial markets of
Dow and Werlang (1992) shows that SEU yields the paradoxical result that an individual should
either buy or short-sell every asset. This follows from local risk neutrality. Apart form the knife
edge case where all assets have the same expected return, every asset either offers positive ex-
pected returns in which cases it should be purchased, or it offers negative expected returns in
which case it should be short sold. Assuming CEU preferences and ambiguity aversion, Dow
and Werlang (1992) show that there is a range of asset prices for which an investor may not
be induced to trade. In particular, ambiguity averse investors will not turn from investing into
assets to short-sales by a marginal change of asset prices as SEU models predict. Kelsey and
Milne (1995) study asset pricing with CEU preferences and show that many conventional asset
pricing results may be generalised to this context.
25Epstein and Wang (1994) extend the Dow-Werlang result to multiple time periods. They show
that there is a continuum of possible values of asset prices in a ﬁnancial market equilibrium.
Thus, ambiguity causes prices to be no longer determinate. They argue that this is a formal
modelofKeynes’intuition thatambiguitywouldcausesassetpricestodependonaconventional
valuation rather than market fundamentals.
In a related paper Epstein (2001) shows that differences in the perception of ambiguity can
explain the consumption home bias paradox. This paradox refers to the fact that domestic con-
sumption is more correlated with domestic income than theory would predict. Epstein (2001)
explains this by arguing the individual perceive foreign income to be more ambiguous.
Mukerji and Tallon (2001) use the CEU to show that ambiguity can be a barrier to risk sharing
through diversiﬁed portfolios. There are securities which could, in principle, allow risk to be
shared. However, markets are incomplete and each security carries some idiosyncratic risk.
If this idiosyncratic risk is perceived as sufﬁciently ambiguous, it is possible that ambiguity
aversion may deter people from trading it. The authors show that ambiguous risks cannot be
diversiﬁed in the same way as standard risks. This has the implication that ﬁrms as well as
individuals may be ambiguity averse.
(ii) Sharing Ambiguous Risks
Consider an economy with one physical commodity and multiple states of nature. If all individ-
uals have SEU preferences and if there is no aggregate uncertainty, then in a market equilibrium
each individual has certain consumption. An individual’s consumption is proportional to the ex-
pected value of his/her endowment. If there is aggregate uncertainty, then risk is shared between
all individuals as an increasing function of their risk tolerance. Individuals’ consumptions are
comonotonic with one another and with the aggregate endowment.
Chateauneuf, Dana, and Tallon (2000) consider risk-sharing when individuals have CEU pref-
erences. In the case where all individuals have beliefs represented by the same convex capacity,
they show that the equilibrium is the same, that would be obtained if all individuals had SEU
preferences and beliefs represented by a particular additive probability distribution. The rea-
26son for this is that in an economy with one good, no production and aggregate uncertainty all
Pareto optimal allocations are comonotonic. CEU preferences evaluate comonotonic acts with
the same set of decision weights. These decision weights can be treated as if they are a prob-
ability distribution. Hence, any competitive equilibrium coincides with an equilibrium of the
economy where SEU decision makers have a probability distribution equal to these decision
weights. In such an equilibrium the optimal degree of risk sharing obtains.
Dana (2004) extends this result by investigating the comparative statics of changes in the en-
dowment. She shows that while any given equilibrium is similar to an equilibrium without
ambiguity, the comparative statics of changes in the endowment is different in an economy
with ambiguity. In the presence of ambiguity small changes in the endowment can cause large
changes in equilibrium prices. The price ratio is always signiﬁcantly higher in states in which
the endowment is relatively scarce. As a consequence individuals who have larger endowments
in such states get higher utility.
6 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, our focus has been on purely behavioural approaches to decision making under
ambiguity. In particular, we have reviewed the literature which takes the Savage, or Anscombe-
Aumann, framework as the basis of the analysis. Hence, ambiguity and ambiguity attitudes of a
decision maker have to be inferred from choices based on preferences over acts alone. We have
seen that such a separation has not been achieved so far. The difﬁculty derives from the fact that
choice behaviour over acts reveals the decision weights of a decision maker. It does not reveal,
however, how much of the decision weight has to be attributed to ambiguity and how much to
ambiguity attitude. In this concluding remarks, we would like to mention two other approaches,
which start from different premises, in order to obtain a separation of ambiguity and ambiguity
attitude. We will also point out another unresolved issue, which is related to the distinction of
ambiguity and ambiguity attitude.
A separation of ambiguity and ambiguity attitude can be achieved if one allows for additional
27a priori information. Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) take two types of acts and two
preference orders as primitives. The representation over second-order acts is assumed to model
ambiguity and ambiguity attitude. Here, exogenously speciﬁed preferences achieve the sepa-
ration of ambiguity and ambiguity attitude. It is not clear, however, whether one can identify
these two types of preference orders from the observed choices over acts.
Nehring (2006a) considers partial information about probabilities which characterise a set of
probability distributions consistent with this information. If a decision maker’s preferences over
acts are compatible with this information, then one can obtain a multiple prior representation
with this set of probability distributions. If one takes this set of priors as representing the
ambiguity, a decision maker’s ambiguity attitude may be derived from the decision weights.
Finally, we would like to point out a problem which is related to the issue of separating am-
biguity from ambiguity attitude. If beliefs of a decision maker are modelled by capacities or
sets of probability distributions, it is no longer clear what is an appropriate support notion. This
problem becomes important if one considers games where players experience ambiguity about
the strategy choice of their opponent. Dow and Werlang (1994), Lo (1996), Marinacci (2000),
and Eichberger and Kelsey (2000) study games with players who hold ambiguous beliefs about
their opponent’s behaviour. Eichberger, Kelsey, and Schipper (2007) provide experimental evi-
dence for ambiguity-aversion of players in a game. This extends previous research by showing
that ambiguity-aversion could also be present in games.
In an equilibrium of a game, understood as a situation in which players have no incentives to
deviate unilaterally from their strategy choices, the information generated by the equilibrium
behaviour of the players must be consistent with their beliefs. In traditional game-theoretic
analysis, where players’ beliefs about their opponents’ behaviour was modelled by probability
distributions, such consistency was guaranteed by a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. In a
mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, the support of the equilibrium mixed strategies contains only
best-reply strategies.
With ambiguity, there is no obvious support notion. For capacities or sets of probability distrib-
28utions, there are many support concepts
21. If one assumes that players play best reply strategies
given some ambiguity about the opponents’ strategy choice, then the support notion should re-
ﬂect a player’s perceived ambiguity. In contrast, a player’s attitude towards ambiguity appears
more as a personal characteristic.
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